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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18al(2)(a) (Supp. 1998) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Did the magistrate correctly dismiss the charges against defendants on the
alternative grounds that the charges violated the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution and that the court lacked jurisdiction.
The magistrate's decision presents questions of law that this Court reviews de
novo. See Salt Lake City v. Dorman-Ligh, 912 P.2d 452, 455 (Utah App. 1996)
(reviewing for correctness trial court's order dismissing criminal information). The
findings of fact underlying the magistrate's legal conclusions are reviewed for clear

error. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) (a trial court's "[f]indings of
fact are reviewed by an appellate court under the clearly erroneous standard").
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Resolution of the issue presented on appeal involves die interpretation of the
following provisions, which are reproduced in Addendum A of the State's brief:
U.S. CONST, amend. XXI, § 2
UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-1-105 (1994)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-9-101 (1994)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-12-201 (1994)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-12-503 (1994)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-106(l) (1997)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-401 (1997)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-201 (Supp. 1998)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged Louis A. Amoroso and Beer Across America (hereafter
collectively referred to as "BAA") in separate five-count informations with the
following offenses:
Count I

Unlawful importation of alcoholic product, a class B misdemeanor,
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-12-503 (1994);

Count II

Unlawful sale or supply of alcoholic beverage or product, a class B
misdemeanor, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-12-201 (1994);

Count III

Unlawful warehousing, distribution, and transportation of liquor, a
class B misdemeanor, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-9-101(2)
(1994);

Count IV

Unlawful sale or supply of alcoholic beverage to minors, a class A
misdemeanor, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-12-203 (Supp. 1996);
and

2

Count V

Pattern of unlawful activity, a second-degree felony, under UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-10-1601 and -1603.5 et seq. (1995).

(R. 70:282-87; 71:297-302; Appellant's Br., Addendum C). 1
BAA moved to dismiss the charges on various grounds. (R. 70:60-82, 96-175;
R. 71:98-209). The magistrate dismissed counts 1, 11, 111, and V, concluding that the
court lacked jurisdiction over BAA and that the charges violated the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 3). Orders on
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (hereafter "Orders") (Appellant's Br., Addendum B).
The State appeals trom the magistrate's order of dismissal.2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In dismissing the charges against BAA, the magistrate found the following
undisputed facts:
1. Beer Across America, Inc. ("BAA") is an Illinois corporation.
Louis A. Amoroso is its president and a shareholder.

2. BAA markets several products, including beer ("heavy" beer,
which qualifies as "liquor" for purposes of the applicable Utah laws), by

1

As the State notes, the parallel proceedings for the two defendants resulted in
separate records, separately paginated. Citations to the separate records in this brief
will be in the same form used by the State in its brief: "R. 70: " refers to a page in
the record for State v. Amoroso, Dist. Ct. No. 971002970, and "R. 7 1 : _ " refers to a
page in the record for State v. Beer Across America, Dist. Ct. No. 971002971. The
single transcript of the hearing on BAA's motions to dismiss will be cited in the usual
manner: "R.
."
2

As the State notes, it voluntarily dismissed Count IV without prejudice. (R.
70:702-04; R. 71:628-30).
3

advertising nationally, including in Utah, by Internet, newsletters, and
word-of-mouth.
3. Customers purchase BAA products by means of mail, telephone
800 number, and perhaps some Internet orders, all initiated by the
purchaser.
4. BAA's sole business location is in Illinois. BAA has no
property in Utah, neither does it have any representatives in this state.
BAA does not engage in any direct solicitation of Utah customers within
this state, and during the period covered by the Information (April
through December, 1996), BAA sent no employees, representatives or
agents into this state.
5. All purchases, whether from Utah customers or from other
locations, require prepayment (by credit card, check, or deposit to a club
account, against which account purchases are charged) of merchandise,
full freight charges, and handling, before any purchases are delivered to
the shipper.
6. All purchases are delivered to a shipper in Illinois, freight paid,
for delivery to the customer in accordance with the customer's
instructions.
7. BAA collects and pays sales tax on all purchases in Illinois, to
Illinois taxation authorities.
Orders 3-4 (Appellant's Br., Addendum B).3

3

The State does not challenge the magistrate's findings of undisputed fact,
choosing instead to set forth its own statement of facts drawn from the probable cause
affidavits attached to the State's informations. Appellant's Br. 5-6. Citing a civil case,
the State takes the position that, in reviewing the magistrate's order of dismissal, this
Court must presume as true the facts alleged in those affidavits (which are identical for
each information), because "'[a] motion to dismiss is appropriate only where it clearly
appears that the plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under
any set of facts they could prove to support their claim."' Appellant's Br. 16 (quoting
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990) (emphasis supplied by
State)). As hereafter discussed, that civil standard for motions to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, does not apply in this criminal case.
4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The magistrate correctly dismissed the charges against BAA on the ground that
they violated the Commerce Clause. The State's attempt in this case to regulate BAA's
sale of alcoholic beverages in Illinois is, under a long line of United States Supreme
Court decisions, prohibited by the Commerce Clause and beyond a state's authority
under the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate alcohol within its borders. Based on his
findings that BAA's sales of beer to Utah buyers were completed in Illinois and that the
buyers were responsible for the shipment of the beei into Utah, the magistrate correctly
concluded that the State could not project its liquor laws beyond its borders to regulate
BAA's commercial activity in Illinois.
The State's attacks on the magistrate's Commerce Clause/Twenty-first
Amendment ruling are either (1) unpreserved or (2) based on an incorrect assumption
that the magistrate was required to accept as fact the State's assertion that BAA's sales
of beer to Utah customers occurred in Utah, not in Illinois, and on a misapplication of
the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause/Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence.
Contrary to the State's view, under Rules 12 and 2t> ot the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the magistrate was free to make findings of fact necessary to the
resolution of BAA's motions to dismiss. The magistrate therefore was not required to
presume that BAA's sales of beer to Utah customers occurred in Utah, as the State

5

contends. Rather, he properly resolved the factual question concerning where BAA's
sales of beer occurred (i.e., in Illinois or in Utah) and entered appropriate findings.
Further, the magistrate properly considered the location of the sales to be a
critical threshold question for purposes of deciding the legal issue concerning the
Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment. Having found that all of the sales
occurred entirely in Illinois, the magistrate correctly concluded that under the
applicable Supreme Court case law, the State's prosecution of BAA amounted to an
attempt to regulate commercial activity in another state in violation of the Commerce
Clause.
Because the State's prosecution is barred by the Commerce Clause, this Court
need not go on to consider the State's challenge to the magistrate's additional ground
for dismissal - lack of jurisdiction. But, in the event the Court finds it necessary to
address the magistrate's ruling on jurisdiction, the State has failed to demonstrate that
he erred in dismissing the charges for lack of jurisdiction.
Under Utah's criminal jurisdiction statute, the provision the State contends
governs this case, Utah does not have jurisdiction to prosecute BAA for conduct that
occurred entirely in Illinois. The State argues that BAA's conduct in Illinois produced
unlawful results in Utah and thus the "result" test contained in the criminal jurisdiction
statute is satisfied. This Court should reject that argument for two reasons. First, the
argument was not sufficiently developed below to preserve the issue for review.

6

Second, the criminal jurisdiction statute requires that the "result" upon which the State
bases its prosecution be an element of the offense charged. None of the "results"
identified by the State are elements of the charged offenses. In short, the magistrate
correctly concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction under the criminal jurisdiction
statute.
Accordingly, the magistrate's order of dismissal should be affirmed.
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT
It is important at the outset to clarify what issues and arguments are properly
before this Court, as there are a number of arguments the State presents on appeal that
were not made below.
The magistrate refused to exercise jurisdiction in this case and dismissed the
charges on two grounds: (1) Utah lacked jurisdiction over BAA under both civil
jurisdiction criteria and criminal jurisdiction criteria, and (2) Utah's attempt to enforce
its alcoholic-beverage-control statutes to regulate conduct occurring entirely outside
Utah violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution and was not
within the state's authority to regulate liquor under the Twenty-first Amendment

The

magistrate concluded that a critical threshold question for both the jurisdictional issue
and the Commerce Clause/Twenty-first Amendment issue was the situs of BAA's sale
of beer to a Utah purchaser - that is, where did title to the beer sold by BAA pass from
BAA to the Utah purchaser, in Illinois or in Utah? He ultimately found that title passed

7

in Illinois, that the sale therefore was completed in Illinois, and that Utah could not
prosecute BAA for conduct that occurred wholly outside its borders.
On appeal, the State attacks every aspect of the magistrate's decision, but, as
explained below, a number of its arguments were not preserved and consequently are
not properly before this Court.
A.

State's situs-of-sale argument
The State contends that "the locus of the sale is not 'a critical threshold issue,' as

the magistrate supposed." Appellant's Br. 12. That argument, however, was not made
below. The State never argued to the magistrate that he need not decide where the sale
occurred in order to resolve the larger issues concerning jurisdiction and the Commerce
Clause. Rather, the State, along with BAA, framed the issues in such a way that situs
of the transaction between BAA and a Utah purchaser was a critical threshold question.
As discussed more fully below, the State made it clear to the magistrate that the
charges were based on the theory that BAA had shipped beer into Utah in violation of
Utah's Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. In short, the alleged illegal shipment of
alcoholic beverages into the state was the targeted activity. That the State considered
situs of sale to be a critical threshold question in determining whether BAA was subject
to prosecution in Utah under the illegal-shipment theory is plain from the way the State
argued the case to the magistrate.
For example, in responding to BAA's argument that the sales of beer to Utah
buyers all occurred in Illinois, that shipment of the beer from Illinois to Utah was paid

8

for and directed by the buyers, and that therefore Utah's attempt to prosecute BAA for
lawful sales of beer in Illinois violated the Commerce Clause, the State wrote:
Only after creating the fiction that Utah residents actually make and
consummate their purchase in Illinois, and that it is the purchasers who
arrange for delivery in Utah, do defendants argue that Utah's laws force
them to change their operations in Illinois.
Pltf.'s Mem. 16 (R. 71:352). The State then argued that under a Utah tax code
provision, the sale took place in Utah, not in Illinois, thus making "all of defendants'
arguments about the transaction taking place in Illinois * * * beside the point." Ibid.
In oral argument, when asked by the magistrate to address the issue of where
title to the beer passed from BAA to the Utah buyer, the prosecutor - never once
hinting that the passage-of-title issue was irrelevant - cited section 70A-2-401(2)(b) of
the Utah Code (a UCC provision) and argued that title to the beer did not pass from
BAA to the buyer until delivery of the beer in Utah.4 That fact, the prosecutor
contended, supported the State's theory that BAA held title to the beer when it crossed
the border into Utah, and thus BAA had shipped alcoholic beverages into the state in
violation of Utah law. (R. 754-56).

4

UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-401(2)(b) (1997) provides that "if the contract
requires delivery at destination, title passes on tender there." Under the UCC as
adopted in Utah, "sale" is defined by the passing of title. UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2106(1) (1997).

9

In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the parties considered the preliminary
question of BAA's status with respect to the beer at the time it entered Utah with the
shipper to be a central component of the magistrate's inquiry. The prosecutor never
took a contrary position below. Indeed, his citation to and argument under a UCC
provision dealing with passage of title and the definition of "sale" demonstrate that he
held a view concerning the importance of the situs-of-sale question that is just the
opposite of what the State now asserts on appeal.
The State may not give the magistrate the impression that it agrees the situs-ofsale question is central to the analysis (by making no suggestion otherwise to him) and
then on appeal argue that the magistrate made a fundamental error in concluding that
the question was pivotal. Accordingly, this Court should not consider that argument.
It is well settled that an appellate court will not consider arguments raised by an
appellant for the first time on appeal absent plain error or exceptional circumstances.
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987); State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358,
359-60 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991).
B.

State's argument that charges were not limited to a "sale"
The State asserts that because the charges were not limited to a "sale,"

"defendants' criminal liability does not hang only on a 'sale' having been
consummated." Appellant's Br. 14. The State did not present that argument to the
magistrate. Rather, as just discussed, it made clear to the magistrate that it was
pursuing an illegal-shipment theory and that that theory depended on the notion that

10

BAA's sales of beer occurred in Utah, not in Illinois. Regarding the illegal-shipment
theory, the prosecutor told the magistrate:
We are not in any way attempting to tell Beer Across America they cannot
have an [I]nternet site. We are not telling them they cannot advertise in
magazines. We are telling them that they take orders and have those
orders sent into the State of Utah, when the alcohol passes the state
borders, then Utah law applies.
* * * *

The violation occurs when alcohol is transported across state lines.
(R. 753, 759). The State further emphasized the point in its memorandum: "If
defendants had not shipped alcoholic beverages into the state, there would be no crime
in Utah." Pltf.'s Mem. 11 (R. 71:347).
That the State's theory depended on resolution of the situs-of-sale question in its
favor was clear from its insistence that the magistrate determine that BAA's sales
occurred in Utah, not in Illinois. In now arguing on appeal that BAA's criminal
liability "does not hang only on a sale having been consummated," the State is
introducing a new theory. Its theory below clearly hung on there having been a sale
and that the sale occurred in Utah. It is well settled that this Court will not consider
new theories raised by an appellant for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., State v.
Ramos, 882 P.2d 149, 155 n. 3 (Utah App. 1994) (refusing to consider defendant's new
theory for first time on appeal); Brown, 856 P.2d at 361 (same). Thus, the Court
should not consider the State's new theory that BAA's liability does not turn on the sale
issue.

11

C.

State's argument that the magistrate relied on the wrong statutory definition
of "sale"
The State argues for the first time on appeal that "[t]he magistrate relied on the

wrong statutory definition of the word 'sale.'" Appellant's Br. 14. According to the
State, the magistrate's reliance on a UCC provision for the definition of sale was
erroneous, because "UCC definitions do not apply in criminal cases." Ibid. It
contends the magistrate should have looked to the definition of "sale" in the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act (UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-1-105(47) (1994)). Id. at 15.
As previously noted, when asked by the magistrate to address the situs-of-sale
issue, the prosecutor offered only the UCC provision (§ 70A-2-401) as authority for
deciding that issue. He never mentioned section 32A-1-105(47). Thus, any error the
magistrate allegedly committed in relying on section 70A-2-401 rather than section
32A-1-105(47) is attributable to the State. Indeed, if error at all, it amounts to invited
error, which this Court will not review. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09
(Utah 1993) ("We have held repeatedly that on appeal, a party cannot take advantage of
an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error.
This rule * * * is known as the 'invited error' doctrine * * *.").
D.

State's plain-error argument concerning jurisdiction
Finally, the State makes an argument concerning jurisdiction that was not made

below and therefore should not be considered by this Court. In arguing that this case is
governed by principles of criminal jurisdiction, not civil "minimum contacts" analysis,

12

the State contends that the magistrate should have concluded that the court had personal
jurisdiction over BAA because BAA was present in court. Appellant's Br. 19-22
(citing numerous cases standing for the proposition that the presence of a criminal
defendant in court is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over the defendant).
Implicitly acknowledging that this argument was not made below, the State seeks
review of the question by contending that "[t]he magistrate's failure to recognize sua
sponte his personal jurisdiction over defendants was plain error." Appellant's Br. 22 n.
10.
To establish plain error, the State must show "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the
appellant[.]" Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. "If any one of these requirements is not
met, plain error is not established." Id. at 1209. The State's plain-error argument fails
because the alleged error could not have been obvious to the magistrate.
Significantly, in the long list of cases the State cites for the proposition that a
criminal defendant's mere presence in court confers personal jurisdiction, there is but
one Utah case: Washington v. Renouf, 5 Utah 2d 185, 299 P.2d 620 (1956). Only that
decision, of all the cases cited by the State, would have been controlling authority for
the magistrate. The question then is whether it should have been obvious to the

13

magistrate that Washington resolves the unique jurisdictional issue presented in this
case.5
In Washington, the Utah Supreme Court's narrow holding was that the trial court
had jurisdiction over the defendant in a burglary prosecution, even though he may have
been returned to Utah from Nevada illegally. 299 P.2d at 621. The court decided no
other issue. It did not have before it the issue presented in the instant case: whether,
under the specific facts of this case, Utah can apply its alcoholic-beverage-control laws
to BAA for commercial conduct that occurred entirely outside the state. That issue is
altogether different from the one decided in Washington. Further, there is no indication
in Washington, or any of the other cases the State cites, that the general proposition for
which they stand ends the analysis in a case like this one, where the issue is the
propriety of Utah's extraterritorial application of its laws to regulate commercial
activity that is lawfully conducted in Illinois.
Contrary to the State's view, therefore, it could not have been obvious to the
magistrate that he need go no further than Washington and similar decisions from other
jurisdictions to decide the jurisdictional issue in this case. The magistrate did not
commit plain error.

The term "jurisdiction" is used here to mean a state's ability to prosecute a
defendant for conduct occurring outside its borders. See Wayne R. LaFave and Jerold
H. Israel, 2 Criminal Procedure § 16.2(a), p. 342 (1984) (discussing the concept of
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E.

Summary
In sum, the State advances a number of arguments that this Court should not

consider because they were not raised below and do not fall within an exception to the
waiver rule. In light of this Court's firm position that it will not consider arguments or
issues presented for the first time on appeal in the absence of plain error or exceptional
circumstances (neither of which have been established by the State), BAA will not
address the State's unpreserved arguments beyond the foregoing discussion. If for
some reason the Court is inclined to address the merits of any of the State's
unpreserved arguments, BAA requests the opportunity to submit additional briefing.
ARGUMENT
A.

The magistrate correctly concluded that the State's prosecution violated the
Commerce Clause and was not within the authority granted by the Twentyfirst Amendment.
1.

Introduction

Regarding the constitutional issues raised by the criminal charges against BAA,
the magistrate ruled that "Utah's attempts to enforce its Alcohol[ic] Beverage Control
legislation, as set forth in Counts I, II and III of the Amended Informations, is violative
of the Commerce Clause and not within the authority granted by the Twenty-first
Amendment." Orders 9 (Appellant's Br., Addendum B). Finding that "[BAA]'s sales
take place entirely outside Utah," the magistrate concluded that "Utah may not extend

jurisdiction and noting that the term carries a number of meanings, including the one
referred to here).
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its authority to regulate * * * activity that occurs entirely outside its borders." Ibid.
On appeal, the State attacks the magistrate's Commerce Clause ruling by arguing
that he erroneously "ignor[ed] the constitutional concepts of transportation,
importation, delivery, and use, choosing instead to focus solely on sales, a concept that
is not mentioned in the Twenty-first Amendment and plays no part in the Supreme
Court's Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence." Appellant's Br. 36 (citation to record
omitted). The State argues that the magistrate should not have considered the question
of where the "sale" of the beer occurred; rather, he should have focused solely on
BAA's alleged "'transportation or importation into' Utah 'for delivery or use therein of
intoxicating liquors'" and the State's effort to regulate that activity. Ibid. According to
the State, the magistrate's "conclusion that this prosecution is unconstitutional was,
consequently, erroneous." Ibid. For the following reasons, the State's argument fails.
2.

Prohibition, its repeal, and the interplay between the Commerce
Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment

At the outset, a brief history of Prohibition, its repeal by the Twenty-first
Amendment, and the interplay between that amendment and the Commerce Clause will
be helpful.
a.

Prohibition

"Despite this country's Puritan beginnings, Americans have always consumed
liquor. The Puritan spirit, however, contributed to transforming this country in the
1800s from a society of intemperance to a society of sobriety." Sidney J. Spaeth, The
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Twenty-First Amendment and State Control Over Intoxicating Liquor: Accommodating
the Federal Interest, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 161, 164 (1991). "During the 1800s, liquor was
regulated at the local and state level. The federal government was passive, and when it
did stir, it acted primarily through a Congress eager to appease the states and to provide
more statutory authority for state control." Id. at 165. In the last part of the 1800s and
at the turn of the century, however, a movement toward greater federal control of
liquor began with the emergence of a growing and aggressive force of prohibitionists.
"[A]cross the country, the temperance banner was carried by the formidable AntiSaloon League (ASL), a federation of churches and temperance societies that evolved
into one of the most powerful political organizations in United States history." Id. at
170.
For the first 17 years of the 1900s, liquor regulation remained primarily in the
hands of the states, with some assisting legislation from Congress. By 1917, 24 states
had prohibition laws. Id. at 175 & n. 92. That set the stage for national prohibition, as
the United States entered World War I. "The escalating anti-drink fervor combined
with wartime regulation to accelerate federal control of intoxicating liquor," id. at 175,
and in January of 1919, the states ratified the Eighteenth Amendment, which prohibited
the "manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation
thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject
to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes." U.S. CONST, amend. XVIII, § 1
(1919, repealed 1933). Thus began Prohibition.
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b.

Repeal of Prohibition

Federal efforts to regulate alcoholic beverages during Prohibition, however,
failed miserably. Spaeth, supra, at 174-80. That dismal experience and the onset of
the Great Depression swung the country's sentiment decisively in favor of the repeal of
the Eighteenth Amendment and a return of alcoholic-beverage control to the states. Id.
at 179-80. With the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment in 1933, the Eighteenth
Amendment was repealed. The Twenty-first Amendment provides in part:
The transportation or importation into any state, territory, or
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
U.S. CONST, amend. XXI, § 2.
The Twenty-first Amendment gave each state the freedom to adopt whatever
regulatory scheme it desired for the control of alcoholic beverages within its borders.
See California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 110
(1980) ("The Twenty-first Amendment grants the States virtually complete control over
whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor
distribution system."); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 299
(1945) (the Twenty-first Amendment grants a state "full authority to determine the
conditions upon which liquor can come into its territory and what will be done with it
after it gets there"). Utah became one of eighteen "control states," "where the state
contracts directly with the producers[,] * * * thus resulting] in state control of virtually
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all aspects of the liquor industry." Note, Liquor Price Affirmation Statutes and the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 186, 188 & n. 23 (1987).
c.

The Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment

Although there has been some disagreement concerning to what degree the
Twenty-first Amendment returned authority over liquor control to the states, see
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 275 (1984) (discussing obscurity of the
legislative history of section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment), it is clear from the
recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court that although the states enjoy a
high degree of control, their authority is subject to certain constitutional limitations.
Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 108 (noting limitations). One of those limitations is the
Commerce Clause.6 Id. at 108-09.
The Supreme Court began to sharpen its analysis of the interplay between the
Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause in Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor
Corp., 311 U.S. 324 (1964). In that case, Idlewild Liquor Corp. was "engaged in the
business of selling bottled wines and liquors to departing international airline travelers
at the John F. Kennedy Airport in New York." 377 U.S. at 325. Idlewild accepted
orders from travelers, received payment, and gave the traveler a receipt for the liquor.
Ibid. Idlewild then transferred the purchased liquor directly to the departing aircraft,
for delivery to the customer only after the customer had arrived at the foreign
6

"The Congress shall have Power * * * [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST, art. I,
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destination. Ibid.
The New York State Liquor Authority informed Idlewild that its business was
illegal under the New York Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, because the business was
unlicensed and could not be licensed under the law. Id. at 326. Idlewild brought an
action for an injunction restraining the state from interfering with its operation, which
had been approved by the United States Bureau of Customs. Id. at 326-27. The
injunction was granted and the case found its way to the Supreme Court for review. Id.
at 327-28.
The issue before the Court was "whether the Twenty-first Amendment so far
obliterates the Commerce Clause as to empower New York to prohibit absolutely the
passage of liquor through its territory, under the supervision of the United States
Bureau of Customs acting under federal law, for delivery to consumers in foreign
countries." Id. at 329 (footnote omitted). In deciding that question, the Court first
rejected the notion that state regulation of liquor is immune from the Commerce
Clause:
To draw a conclusion from [our previous] decisions that the
Twenty-first Amendment has somehow operated to "repeal" the
Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is
concerned would * * * be an absurd oversimplification. If the Commerce
Clause had been pro tanto "repealed," then Congress would be left with
no regulatory power over interstate or foreign commerce in intoxicating
liquor. Such a conclusion would be patently bizarre and is demonstrably
incorrect.

§ 8, cl. 3.
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Id. at 331-32. In short, because "the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce
Clause are parts of the same Constitution^] * * * each must be considered in the light
of the other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete
case." Ibid.
The Court then upheld the injunction against New York, concluding that it could
not constitutionally regulate commerce with foreign nations, where the ultimate delivery
of the liquor occurred. Id. at 333-34. New York simply could not, consistently with
the Commerce Clause, "totally * * * prevent transactions carried on under the aegis of
a law passed by Congress in the exercise of its explicit power under the Constitution to
regulate commerce with foreign nations." Id. at 334.
Twenty-two years later in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State
Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986), the Court again found unconstitutional New
York's attempt to regulate commercial activity involving alcoholic beverages. This
time, New York had applied its alcoholic-beverage-control laws so as to regulate
conduct that occurred entirely outside the state. Building on its decision in Hostetter,
the Court held that New York's extraterritorial regulation of liquor-related commercial
activity violated the Commerce Clause and was not saved by the Twenty-first
Amendment.
The New York law at issue in Brown-Forman prohibited distillers and their
agents from selling to wholesalers in New York except in accordance with a price
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schedule filed each month with the State Liquor Authority. 476 U.S. at 575. The law
also
requirefd] any distiller or agent that files a schedule of prices to include an
affirmation that "the bottle and case price of liquor to wholesalers set
forth in the schedule is no higher than the lowest price at which such item
of liquor will be sold by such [distiller] to any wholesaler anywhere in
any other state (or state agency) which owns and operates retail liquor
stores" during the month covered by the schedule.
Id. at 576 (brackets in original).
Brown-Forman Distillers was a distiller that owned several brands of liquor that
it sold in New York and other states. Ibid. It contended that New York's "affirmation
law" forced it to discontinue certain promotional-pricing programs (legal in other states
but not in New York) because such programs prevented it from simultaneously
complying with the affirmation laws of New York and the other states. That, BrownForman argued, constituted direct regulation of interstate commerce by New York in
violation of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 578.
The Court's analysis "center[ed] on whether New York's affirmation law
regulate[d] commerce in other States." Id. at 580. If the law had the effect of
regulating conduct occurring wholly outside the state, then it violated the Commerce
Clause. Ibid. The Court concluded that New York's law had just that effect and thus
was unconstitutional: "While New York may regulate the sale of liquor within its
borders, and may seek low prices for its residents, it may not 'project its legislation
into [other States] by regulating the price to be paid' for liquor in those States." Id. at
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582-83 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935)) (brackets in
original).
The Court rejected New York's contention that the Twenty-first Amendment
saved the law from invalidation under the Commerce Clause. Noting that "[i]t is well
settled that the Twenty-first Amendment did not entirely remove state regulation of
alcohol from the reach of the Commerce Clause," the Court viewed its task as being
the reconciliation of the interests protected by the two constitutional provisions. Id. at
584-85. It concluded that the Commerce Clause prevailed:
New York has a valid interest in regulating sales of liquor within
the territory of New York. Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment,
however, speaks only to state regulation of the "transportation or
importation into any State * * * for delivery or use therein" of alcoholic
beverages. That Amendment, therefore, gives New York only the
authority to control sales of liquor in New York, and confers no authority
to control sales in other States.
Id. at 585 (emphasis added). See also Healy v. The Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 34142 (1989) (rejecting the argument that Connecticut's price-affirmation statute for out-ofstate shippers of beer was authorized by the Twenty-first Amendment regardless of its
effect on interstate commerce, and holding that under Brown-Forman, the statute
violated the Commerce Clause because its practical effect was to regulate liquor sales in
other states).
As the magistrate recognized in the instant case, the Commerce Clause/Twentyfirst Amendment analysis that the Supreme Court initially formulated in Hostetter and
then refined in Brown-Forman resolves against the State the issue of whether Utah's
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extraterritorial application of its liquor laws to regulate BAA's conduct in Illinois is
permitted by the Commerce Clause.
3.

The State's attempt to enforce Utah's alcoholic-beverage-control laws
against BAA for lawful commercial conduct occurring wholly outside
Utah violates the Commerce Clause and is not saved by the Twentyfirst Amendment.

The specific statutes that the State seeks to enforce in this case, although
technically criminal statutes, are regulatory in nature and, like every other provision in
Utah's Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, apply only to activity in this state. See UTAH
CODE ANN. § 32A-1-102(3) (1994) ("The provisions of this title govern alcoholic
beverage control in this state * * *." (emphasis added)). The issue is whether the State
may constitutionally apply those statutes to BAA. As was clear from the parties'
arguments below, resolution of that issue turns on whether the conduct the State seeks
to regulate occurred entirely outside Utah's borders. In short, did BAA's sales to Utah
buyers occur in Illinois or in Utah?
a.

Utah may not constitutionally regulate the sale of alcohol in Illinois.

In the court below, BAA argued that under UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-401(2)(a)
(1997) and the parallel provision in Illinois' UCC (810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2401(2)(a) (1993))7, its sales of beer to Utah buyers were completed in Illinois, because

7

As previously noted, section 70A-2-401(2)(a) provides that "if the contract
requires or authorizes the seller to send the goods to the buyer but does not require him
to deliver them at destination, title passes to the buyer at the time and place of
shipment^]" Identical language appears in Illinois' code. 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/2-401(2)(a) (1993). Passage of title defines a "sale." UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-224

title to the beer passed from BAA to the buyers in Illinois. BAA further argued that the
buyer was responsible for the shipment of the beer from Illinois into Utah, and thus
Utah's attempt to regulate BAA's lawful sale of a product in Illinois violated the
Commerce Clause.
The State, on the other hand, argued that under UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 70A-2-401(2)(b) (1997), title to the beer did not pass to the buyers until delivery in
Utah, and thus the sales occurred there.8 It further argued that BAA, as the holder of
title to the beer when it entered Utah, was responsible for shipment of the beer from
Illinois into Utah, and therefore Utah could prosecute BAA for shipping alcoholic
beverages into the state. As the magistrate noted, "the State concede[d]: 'If defendants
had not shipped alcoholic beverages into the State, there would be no crime in Utah.'"
Orders 7.
The magistrate rejected the State's position in favor of BAA's. He found as a
matter of fact and law that BAA's "sales all took place in Illinois, where title passed
when the prepaid product was delivered to the shipper." Orders 4 (Appellant's Br.,
Addendum B). He expressly found as fact that "[a] 11 purchases are delivered to a
shipper in Illinois, freight paid, for delivery to the customer in accordance with the

106(1) (1997) ("A 'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a
price (Section 70A-2-401)."). See also 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-106(1) (1993)
(setting forth identical principle).
8

As previously noted, section 70A-2-401(2)(b) provides that "if the contract
requires delivery at destination, title passes on tender there."
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customer's instructions." Id. at 3 (emphasis added). He further found that "BAA's
sole business location is in Illinois" and that "during the period covered by the
Information (April through December, 1996), BAA sent no employees, representatives
or agents into [Utah]." Ibid.
Implicit in the magistrate's findings is that the Utah buyer controlled the
shipment of beer from Illinois to Utah and that BAA exercised no control over that
aspect of the transaction. In short, he implicitly found that the shipper was acting as
the buyer's agent - not as BAA's employee, representative, or agent - when the shipper
entered Utah with the beer. See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1994) (in
the absence of express findings, an appellate court will assume that the trial court found
facts in accord with its decision whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the
court actually made such findings).
The State challenges neither the magistrate's express findings of fact, nor his
implicit findings, nor the adequacy of the factual findings as a whole to support his
ultimate finding that all of BAA's sales were completed in Illinois. Absent any such
challenge, this Court must accept the magistrate's findings of fact, which, in turn,
dispose of the State's claim that BAA shipped beer into Utah because the sales took
place in Utah rather than Illinois.9

As previously noted, the State contends that this Court must presume that the sales
occurred in Utah, as asserted in the probable cause affidavits supporting the informations.
As explained in part A(3)(b) of this brief {infra at 33-35), that contention is incorrect.
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Based on the foregoing findings, the issue before the magistrate was whether
Utah could constitutionally regulate sales of alcoholic beverages that occurred entirely
in Illinois. On that issue, the magistrate ruled that three of the charges against BAA
constituted an unconstitutional extraterritorial application of Utah's alcoholic-beveragecontrol laws:
Utah may not extend its authority to regulate * * * activity that occurs
entirely outside its borders. In view of this court's ruling that defendants'
sales take place entirely outside Utah, the court finds that Utah's attempts
to enforce its Alcohol[ic] Beverage Control legislation, as set forth in
Counts I, II and III of the Amended Information, is violative of the
Commerce Clause and not within the authority granted by the Twentyfirst Amendment.
Orders 9 (Appellant's Br., Addendum B).
Relying on the analysis of Brown-Forman, the magistrate found the Commerce
Clause violation obvious:
The Court finds that the facts of this case may argue more strongly
than Brown-Forman for invocation of the Commerce Clause prohibition
on interference with interstate commerce. The New York statute dealt
specifically and solely with pricing of liquor sold in the state.
Nevertheless, the Court found that the impact on liquor pricing in other
states was real. In this case, the law itself does not proclaim an intent to
regulate sale of liquor in another state, and that probably is not the intent
of the enforcement agency in bringing these actions, but given this court's
finding regarding the place of sale, that is the effect, and it is prohibited.
Accordingly, the court finds that while the underlying statutes are not
unconstitutional on their face, they are unconstitutional as applied in this
case, to sales that occurred in Illinois.
Id. at 9-10.
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Like the Supreme Court in Brown-Forman, the magistrate concluded that a state
may not project its laws beyond its borders to regulate commercial activity in another
state:
This court cannot accept the notion that the Illinois mail order seller
should face any greater criminal liability than the Evanston, Wyoming[]
beer seller or the Napa Valley, California[] wine merchant, who sells to a
Utah buyer, fully aware that the buyer intends to take his or her purchase
directly to Utah. If title passes out of state, whether by direct delivery to
the in-person Utah buyer, or by delivery to the buyer's shipper (under
long-established principles of commercial law), title has passed, and the
act of supplying is complete, wholly outside Utah's borders.
Orders 9 (emphasis in original).
As noted above, the State's only challenge to the magistrate's Commerce
Clause/Twenty-first Amendment ruling is that "[t]he magistrate erred by ignoring the
constitutional concepts of transportation, delivery, and use, choosing instead to focus
solely on sales." Appellant's Br. 36. But as already discussed, the magistrate's focus
on the situs-of-sale issue was directly attributable to the State's theory of criminal
liability and the absence of any indication from the State that he should not focus on
that issue.
Furthermore, the State is simply wrong in asserting that "sales" of alcoholic
beverages cannot be the focus of a court's constitutional analysis where the Twenty-first
Amendment is involved. There is no support in the United State Supreme Court's case
law for the State's view that regulation of the "sale" of alcohol does not come under the
umbrella of the Twenty-first Amendment because "that concept is not mentioned in the
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Twenty-first Amendment and plays no part in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence."
Appellant's Br. 36. Brown-Forman directly contradicts that view. As previously
noted, in that case, the Court held that New York's affirmation law regulated the sale
of liquor in other states in violation of the Commerce Clause. In so holding, the Court
specifically said that the law was not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment, which
"gives New York only the authority to control sales of liquor in New York, and
confers no authority to control sales in other States." Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 585
(emphasis added).
Moreover, both prior to and after Brown-Forman, the Supreme Court recognized
that the regulation of the "sale" of alcohol is a core Twenty-first Amendment power.
For example, in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984), the Court
could not have made the point more clearly:
In rejecting the claim that the Twenty-first Amendment ousted the
Federal government of all jurisdiction over interstate traffic in liquor, we
have held that when a State has not attempted directly to regulate the sale
or use of liquor within its borders - the core § 2 power - a conflicting
exercise of federal authority may prevail.
467 U.S. at 713 (emphasis added). The Court further stated:
[We] hold that when * * * a state regulation squarely conflicts with the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes of federal law, and the
State's central power under the Twenty-first amendment of regulating the
times, places, and manner under which liquor may be imported and sold
is not directly implicated, the balance between state and federal power tips
decisively in favor of federal law, and enforcement of the state statute is
barred by the Supremacy Clause.
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Id. at 716 (emphasis added). See also 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 346
(1987) (reaffirming that the Twenty-first Amendment grants a state virtually complete
control over importation or sale of liquor within its borders).
To summarize, the Supreme Court's holding in Brown-Forman made it clear that
although the Twenty-first Amendment gives a state broad authority to regulate liquor
within its own borders, it does not permit a state to project its liquor laws beyond its
borders and regulate commercial activity involving liquor in other states. It does not
matter whether that activity involves "sales" or some other activity. Thus, under the
Brown-Forman line of cases, Utah may not project its laws beyond its borders to
regulate a transaction that occurs entirely in Illinois.
As the magistrate correctly observed, permitting the State to prosecute BAA in
this case would lead to the conclusion that Utah is free to enforce its alcoholicbeverage-control laws against the California winery, the Wyoming convenience store,
and the Oregon microbrewery that lawfully sell alcoholic-beverage products to a
visiting Utah resident who they know or reasonably believe will return to Utah with
those products. Such a conclusion would fly in the face of Brown-Forman and the
numerous other Supreme Court decisions holding that a state may not enforce its liquor
laws to regulate conduct occurring wholly outside its borders.
Moreover, if BAA is subject to prosecution under the facts of this case, one
could not avoid the conclusion that those lawfully engaged in the sale of liquor in any
state would have to ensure that they were not selling to a non-resident who is prohibited
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by his or her home-state liquor laws from returning with liquor purchased in another
state. That is just the sort of extraterritorial regulation the Supreme Court repeatedly
has condemned as violative of the Commerce Clause and outside a state's authority
under the Twenty-first Amendment.
The State simply has failed to show that the application of Utah law in this case
either survives the force of the Commerce Clause or is saved by the Twenty-first
Amendment.10 The magistrate correctly applied the analysis of Brown-Forman to the
facts of this case. Because the State's attempt to regulate commercial conduct
occurring wholly outside Utah violates the Commerce Clause under Brown-Forman,
this Court should affirm the dismissal of the charges against BAA. The Constitution
simply does not permit the State of Utah to trundle out the great machinery of
government and interfere with lawful commercial activity in another state.11

0

In its discussion of the Commerce Clause/Twenty-first Amendment issue, the
State asserts that its "concern for mail-order liquor sales is legitimate, inasmuch as such
sales raise serious concerns for underage drinking." Appellant's Br. 32 & n. 12. In
support of that assertion, the State cites a number of newspaper articles, reports, and
studies on the extent of underage drinking. Ibid. Although controlling underage
drinking certainly is a legitimate goal of state regulation under the Twenty-first
Amendment, none of the authorities the State cites purports to link mail-order liquor
sales to the problem of underage drinking. Furthermore, the State never presented any
of those authorities to the magistrate; nor did it argue to him that the State's legitimate
concern about underage drinking had any bearing on the Commerce Clause/Twentyfirst Amendment analysis. Accordingly, this Court should not consider the State's
discussion of underage drinking.
11

A Florida court recently reached a similar conclusion in dismissing an action
brought by the State of Florida against several out-of-state mail-order sellers of alcoholicbeverage products for allegedly selling and delivering those products to Florida
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In summary, the State's decision to file criminal charges against BAA flies in the
face of the history surrounding repeal of the eighteenth Amendment, the plain language
of section 2 of the twenty-first amendment, and the long line of Supreme Court
decisions interpreting section 2.
As pointed out in this brief, repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment evidences the
failure of Prohibition in this country. Thus, adoption of the Twenty-first Amendment
and section 2 expresses the reality that there was no national consensus concerning
alcoholic-beverage traffic. Accordingly, Congress delegated to the states the power to
establish alcohol policy within the jurisdiction of each state. The authority cited in this
brief documents the jurisdictional limitation of a state's policy. Where a state has
attempted to impose its will on activities beyond its borders, such an attempt has for the
most part failed in light of the Commerce Clause.
Utah residents and others travel and enjoy the experience of purchasing
consumer products. Moreover, it is common knowledge that Utah resdients and
tourists from other states have, for a long period of time, elected to purchase alcoholic
products out-of-state and bring them into Utah. That activity has proliferated over the
years without resistance from the State. It is for these reasons that the State's action in
this case is particularly troublesome.

customers in violation of state law. State v. Sam's Wines & Liquors, No. 963602 (Sept.
3, 1997), appeal pending, No. 97-03828 (Fla. 1st DCA).
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b.

This Court is not required to presume as true the State's allegation
that BAA's sales of beer to Utah buyers occurred in Utah and not in
Illinois.

The foregoing analysis rests on the magistrate's finding that BAA's sales of beer
to Utah buyers occurred in Illinois, not in Utah. Although the State does not expressly
argue the point in the section of its brief addressing the Commerce Clause/Twenty-first
Amendment issue, an implied basis for its position on that issue may be its contention made in another section of its brief (the part addressing the magistrate's application of
the UCC) - that BAA's sales occurred in Utah, not in Illinois. The State contends that
the magistrate, in considering BAA's motions to dismiss, was required to presume as
true the State's assertion that "[BAA's] contract requires * * * that beer be delivered to
the customer's house [in Utah]," and that "consequently, even under the UCC, 'title
passe[d] on tender there.'" Appellant's Br. 16 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2401(2)(b) (1997)). The State further asserts that on review this Court must make the
same presumption. See Appellant's Br. 2 (stating that in reviewing this case, this Court
"will 'accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable
inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to plaintiffs'" - quoting Hebertson
v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1390 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted)).
The problem with the State's argument is that it grafts principles of civil
procedure onto a criminal case where specific rules of criminal procedure apply. The
State cites only civil cases decided under Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
in support of its position. See Appellant's Br. 2, 16 (citing Hebertson, 923 P.2d at
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1390, and Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990)). Those
cases are inapposite, because the magistrate proceeded under Rules 12 and 25, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, in dismissing the charges against BAA. Orders 1-2
(noting that BAA's motions were filed pursuant to those rules) (Appellant's Br.,
Addendum B). As explained below, those rules permitted the magistrate to make
necessary factual findings in resolving the issues presented by BAA's motions to
dismiss.
The State makes no claim that the magistrate improperly proceeded under Rules
12 and 25. Rule 25 permits a court to dismiss the charges against a defendant without
trial "[i]n its discretion, for substantial cause," and requires dismissal if "[t]he court is
without jurisdiction." Utah R. Crim. P. 25(a) & (b)(4). Nothing in that rule prohibits
the court from making findings of fact necessary for the order of dismissal. Rule 12,
which provides that "application to the court for an order shall be by motion,"
expressly contemplates factual findings by a court in its determination of a motion:
"Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its
findings on the record." Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c).
Thus, the rules of criminal procedure applicable to this case permit a court to
make necessary findings of fact in deciding a motion to dismiss. Contrary to the State's
view, the magistrate was free to make findings of fact in deciding BAA's motions to
dismiss, and he was not required to presume as true the prosecutor's proffer concerning
the terms of the contract between BAA and its Utah customers. That is particularly

34

true when the motion to dismiss involves the constitutionality of a prosecution like that
here, which squarely presents the issue of whether the application of Utah's alcoholicbeverage-control laws violates the Commerce Clause. In this case, resolution of that
legal issue required the magistrate to make a factual determination of where BAA's
sales of beer occurred - inside or outside Utah.
Accordingly, as this Court does with other trial court decisions on Rule 12
motions, the findings of fact underlying the magistrate's decision on BAA's motions to
dismiss are reviewed under the deferential "clearly erroneous" standard of review.
See, e.g., State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993) (trial court's findings of
fact underlying motion to suppress are reviewed under "clearly erroneous" standard);
State v. Keitz, 856 P.2d 685, 689 (Utah App. 1993) (factual findings underlying denial
of motion to dismiss based on entrapment reviewed for clear error). A reviewing court
will find clear error only if the factual findings are not supported by the record,
resolving all disputes in the evidence in the light most favorable to the lower court's
determination. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).
Because the State does not contend that the magistrate's findings are clearly
erroneous, let alone make a showing that they are, this Court must accept those findings
on review.
4.

Summary

The foregoing demonstrates that the magistrate correctly dismissed the charges
against BAA as violative of the Commerce Clause. That disposes of the State's appeal.
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This Court need not go on to address the State's challenge to the magistrate's
alternative ground for dismissal - that the court lacked jurisdiction under both civil and
criminal jurisdiction criteria - because, even assuming the magistrate erred in that
regard, the Commerce Clause bars this prosecution.
If, however, the Court is inclined to consider the State's arguments concerning
the ruling on jurisdiction, BAA addresses them below.
B.

The magistrate correctly concluded that Utah lacks jurisdiction to enforce its
alcoholic-beverage-control laws against BAA for conduct occurring outside
the state.
The State contends that the magistrate's alternative basis for dismissal - lack of

jurisdiction - also is incorrect. It argues that in concluding there was no jurisdiction,
the magistrate erroneously applied a civil "minimum contacts" analysis and further
erred in determining that even under Utah's criminal jurisdiction statute, there was no
jurisdiction. For the following reasons, the magistrate's ruling on jurisdiction should
be upheld.
1.

Introduction

Although the "minimum contacts" issue raised by the State is not as easily
resolved as it would have this Court believe - particularly where, as in this case, a
corporation is named as the defendant in a criminal proceeding12 - this Court need not

See David James Homsey, Comment, CriminalJurisdiction Over Foreign
Corporations: The Application of a Minimum Contacts Theory, 17 San Diego L. Rev.
429 (1980) (arguing that a "minimum contacts" analysis is appropriate where a state
attempts to assert criminal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation).
36

decide that issue to dispose of the State's challenge to the ruling on jurisdiction.
Because the State cannot prevail under the criminal jurisdiction statute it contends
governs this case, the Court can dispose of the State's assignment of error on that
ground alone.
In examining the limited issue concerning the criminal jurisdiction statute, it is
important at the outset to discuss just what the magistrate was deciding when he ruled
that the court lacked jurisdiction. Given the magistrate's finding that BAA's sales
occurred in Illinois, the narrow jurisdictional question presented to him was whether the
criminal jurisdiction statute permitted Utah to apply its criminal laws to BAA based on
conduct that occurred entirely outside Utah. He concluded that it did not:
In view of the court's ruling that the sale[s] occurred - and [were]
completed - in Illinois, the State's own language ends the inquiry. At
page 11 of its memorandum, the State concedes: "If defendants had not
shipped alcoholic beverages into the State, there would be no crime in
Utah."
Orders 7. The validity of that conclusion is the issue before this Court.
1.

The criminal jurisdiction statute

The State maintains that UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-201 (Supp. 1998) governs the
jurisdictional question presented here. That statute provides in part:
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense
which he commits, while either within or outside the state, by his own
conduct or that of another for which he is legally accountable, if:
(a) the offense is committed either wholly or partly within the
state[.]
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* * * *

(2) An offense is committed partly within this state if either the
conduct which is any element of the offense, or the result which is such
an element, occurs within the state.
* * # *

(5) The judge shall determine jurisdiction.
The State contends that based on section 76-l-201(l)(a) and (2), BAA is subject
to prosecution in Utah because its "conduct [in Illinois] caused an unlawful result
within this state," and thus BAA committed the charged offenses partly within Utah.
Appellant's Br. 29-30. The State relies solely on the "result" test set forth in section
76-1-201(2), making no claim that BAA committed any act in Utah that would subject it
to prosecution under the alternative test contained in that provision -i.e.,

"conduct

which is any element of the offense * * * occurs within the state."
The State's "result" argument is different from the one it articulated with clarity
to the magistrate, which was that BAA had shipped beer into Utah in violation of Utah.
That is, BAA had committed a criminal act within Utah, and that act subjected it to
prosecution here. Although the prosecutor made a passing reference to the "result"
theory the State now presses on appeal, he did not meaningfully develop that theory certainly not to the degree the State has in this Court. (R. 757). Accordingly, this
Court should decline to consider the State's argument on appeal and affirm the
magistrate's ruling on jurisdiction. See, e.g., State v. McGrath, 928 P.2d 1033, 1039
n. 2 (Utah App. 1996) (nominal reference to state constitution was insufficient to lay

38

groundwork for "thoughtful and probing analysis" of issue in trial court); State v.
Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah App. 1993) ("The trial court is considered the proper
forum in which to commence thoughtful and probing analysis of issues.").
In any event, the magistrate's dismissal of the charges for lack of jurisdiction
should be affirmed for the following additional reasons.
2.

Count III

In Count III, BAA was charged with unlawful warehousing, distribution, and
transportation of alcoholic beverages in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-9-101(2)
(1994), which provides in part:
A person may not warehouse, distribute, or transport liquor for
resale to wholesale or retail customers unless the person is issued a
warehousing license by the commission. A separate license is required
for each warehousing facility.
The State contends that "[t]he charged facts establish that, as a result of defendants'
actions in Illinois, alcohol was distributed or transported for sale or resale to retail
customers within this state without a license." Appellant's Br. 31.
In making that argument, the State fails to take into account the precise wording
of section 76-1-201(2) and the distinction between "result" and "conduct" in the
criminal law. In their treatise on criminal law, Professors LaFave and Scott explain
how crimes traditionally are defined and how the definitions sometimes require that
conduct produce certain results:
The various crimes (whether they are statutory crimes or common
law crimes) are of course variously defined as to what actions and states
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of mind are required for guilt. Here we may note that the definitions also
* * * sometimes require that the necessary conduct produce certain
results. * * * Some crimes are so worded that a bad result is needed for
commission of the crime. For instance, criminal homicide requires the
death of a human being, battery the injury of such a person, arson the
burning of property, malicious mischief the injury or destruction of
property, false pretenses the loss of title to property or money.
Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., 1 Substantive Criminal Law § 1.2(c), p. 11
(1986) (emphasis in original). In short, "conduct" and "result" are distinct concepts.
A "result" is the product of "conduct."
Under section 76-l-201(l)(a) and (2), a person is subject to prosecution in Utah
if the person's conduct produces a result within the state, even though the conduct
occurred outside the state. The "result," however, must be an element of the charged
offense. § 76-1-201(2). Therefore, one must look to the definition of a particular
offense to determine whether a "result" is actually an element of that offense.
Turning to the charge in Count III, the terms "distribute" and "transport," as
used in section 32A-9-101(2), are not "results"; rather, they are "conduct." Put
another way, the statute does not set out distribution and transportation of liquor as a
prohibited result; rather, it prohibits the act of distributing or transporting . Thus, to
be guilty of a violation of section 32A-9-101(2), a person must have personally
distributed or transported liquor in Utah. Although a person's conduct outside Utah
theoretically could result in the distribution or transportation of liquor in Utah by
someone else, that result is not an element of the offense defined in section 32A-9-
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101(2). Indeed, that provision contains only prohibited conduct; it does not include any
prohibited result.
In short, the "result" the State identifies for Count III is not an element of the
offense defined in section 32A-9-101(2). The State's theory of jurisdiction therefore
fails the "result" test set forth in section 76-1-201(2), which limits Utah's jurisdiction to
cases where the "result" upon which the State bases its prosecution "occurs within the
state" and "is * * * an element [of the charged offense]." (Emphasis added.)
Jurisdiction does not lie under section 76-1-201(2) simply because the State can point to
an undesirable result in Utah from conduct outside the state.
Looking at the question in a slightly different way, it is clear from the plain
language of section 32A-9-101 that the statute applies only to a person who engages in
warehousing, distributing, or transporting liquor within the State of Utah. That is so
because section 32A-9-101 must be read in light of UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-1-102(3)
(1994), which states: "The provisions of this title govern alcoholic beverage control in
this state * * *." (Emphasis added.)

Further, the customers of the "person" referred

to in section 32A-9-101(2) are "wholesale or retail customers" who receive liquor on a
"resale" basis. In short, the customers are wholesalers or retailers.
The State's charging documents (including the probable cause affidavits) do not
allege any facts that would support a finding that BAA engaged in warehousing,
distributing, or transporting liquor within Utah for resale to a wholesaler or retailer.
Thus, BAA's conduct - as alleged by the State - is not covered by the plain language of
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section 32A-9-101(2). That fact, coupled with the fact that the "result" test of section
76-1-201(2) is not satisfied, gives this Court ample grounds for affirming the
magistrate's dismissal of Count III. See DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah
1995) ("It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm a lower court's ruling on
any proper grounds, even though the lower court relied on some other ground.").
3.

Count II

The magistrate's dismissal of Count II for lack of jurisdiction was correct for the
same reasons that pertain to Count III. In Count II, BAA was charged with unlawful
sale or supply of alcohol in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-12-201 (1994), which
provides in part:
(1) It is unlawful for any person * * * to keep for sale, * * * sell,
offer to sell, or otherwise furnish or supply to another, any alcoholic
beverage or product, except as provided by this title or the rules of the
commission adopted under this title.
(2) Except as otherwise provided, a manufacturer, supplier, or
importer of liquor, wine, and heavy beer products * * * may not sell * * *
or otherwise furnish or supply these products to another within this state
other than the department and military installations.
The State contends that "[t]he charged facts establish that, as a result of defendants'
actions in Illinois, liquor was furnished or supplied to persons within this state other
than the DABC and military installations." Appellant's Br. 30.
As is the case with respect to distribution and transportation of liquor under
section 32A-9-101(2) (the statutory basis for the charge in Count III), the furnishing or
supplying of liquor that is prohibited by section 32A-12-201 is "conduct" not a
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"result." Section 32A-12-201, like section 32A-9-101(2), contains only prohibited
conduct; it targets no prohibited result. The "result" identified by the State simply is
not an element of the offense defined by section 32A-12-201. Consequently, the State's
"result" theory of jurisdiction fails for Count II for the same reason that it fails for
Count III.
Moreover, like section 32A-9-101(2), section 32A-12-201 applies only to
conduct that occurs in Utah. The State therefore may not prosecute a person under that
statute for conduct that occurred entirely outside the state. It has attempted to do just
that in this case. The magistrate correctly prohibited the State from doing so by
dismissing Count II.
4.

Count I

Finally, the State's similar argument with respect to Count I also should be
rejected. In that count, the State charged BAA with unlawful importation of alcohol in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-12-503 (1994), which states:
It is unlawful for any * * * person[] to ship or transport or cause to be
shipped or transported into this state * * * any alcoholic product, or to * *
* furnish any alcoholic product to any person within this state, when the
alcoholic product is intended by any interested person to be received,
possessed, sold, or in any manner used * * * in violation of the laws of
this state.
The State argues that "[t]he alleged facts establish that, as a result of defendants'
actions in Illinois, liquor was shipped or transported into Utah or furnished to persons
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within this state who intended to possess or use it in any manner that violates state
laws." Appellant's Br. 30.
Insofar as the State relies on the "furnish[ing] any alcoholic product" element of
the offense defined in section 32A-12-503, that element is "conduct," not a "result,"
and therefore cannot provide the basis for jurisdiction under the State's "result" theory.
Furthermore, under the plain language of the statute, read in light of section 32A-1102(3)'s proviso that the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act regulates alcoholic beverages
only within Utah, a person must have done the "furnishing" within the state to be guilty
of violating the statute. Because the State does not contend that BAA did any act within
Utah that constitutes "furnishing," there is no basis for criminal liability.
On the other hand, if the State is arguing that jurisdiction lies because BAA's
conduct in Illinois "caused" alcoholic beverages to be shipped or transported into Utah
and thus BAA's extraterritorial conduct created a "result" in Utah that subjects it to
jurisdiction under section 76-1-201(2), that argument arguably finds support in the
following language of section 32A-12-503: "It is unlawful for any * * * person to * *
* cause to be shipped or transported into this state * * * any alcoholic product * * * in
violation of the laws of this state." (Emphasis added.) That language appears to define
a prohibited result, unlike the language of sections 32A-9-101(2) and 32A-12-201.
The State, however, ultimately is no better off with respect to Count I than it is
on the other counts. As discussed in part A of this brief, the State's theory before the
magistrate was that BAA had shipped beer into Utah. In arguing that theory, the State

44

took the position that location of BAA's sale of beer was a critical threshold question,
making it clear to the magistrate that the State believed BAA's criminal liability for
illegal shipment depended on a determination that title to the beer passed from BAA to
the buyer in Utah and thus that the sale occurred in Utah rather than Illinois.
As already noted, although the prosecutor made vague references to the concept
of criminal liability based on a defendant's extraterritorial conduct causing an unlawful
result in Utah, he never articulated a precise theory of BAA's liability based on that
concept. (R. 757). Indeed, the State argued only a conduct-within-the-state theory:
"The elements of the crimes charged against the defendants in this action involve the
delivery of alcoholic beverages into Utah (directly, or through agents). * * * If the
deliveries, furnishing, or transportation occurs in Utah, the State has jurisdiction * *
*." Pltf.'s Mem. 11 (R. 71:347).
The State may respond that such precision concerning its "result" theory was not
required in presenting its the case to the magistrate. But both the Commerce Clause
issue and the jurisdictional issue demanded a clear articulation of the State's theory. In
pursuing its unprecedented criminal prosecution against BAA for commercial activity
conducted wholly and lawfully in Illinois, such imprecision in presenting its case to the
magistrate is inexcusable.
In sum, the State's theory that BAA's out-of-state conduct caused the shipment
or transportation of liquor into Utah is unpreserved and therefore should not be
considered by this Court. The absence of any meaningful development of that theory
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deprived BAA of the opportunity to respond and denied the magistrate the opportunity
to consider the issue. As this Court has said in explaining the reasons for declining to
consider unpreserved arguments:
The trial court is considered the proper forum in which to commence
thoughtful and probing analysis of issues. Failing to argue an issue * * *
in that forum denies the trial court the opportunity to make any findings of
fact or conclusions of law pertinent to the claimed error. * * * Therefore,
to ensure the trial court's opportunity to consider an issue, appellate
review of criminal cases in Utah requires * * * some form of specific
preservation of claims of error * * *.
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah App. 1993).
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the magistrate's dismissal of Count I.13
C.

The State is not without a remedy in cases like this one; the Utah buyers and
their agents, the shippers, are subject to prosecution under existing law.
The State may complain that affirming the dismissal of the charges in this case

leaves it without a remedy for a perceived violation of Utah's alcoholic-beveragecontrol laws. The simple answer is that under current law, the State can file criminal
charges against the Utah buyer and the buyer's agent, the shipper.
Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-12-212 (1994), a person may not "have or
possess within this state any liquor unless authorized by this title or the rules of the
commission." Thus, a Utah resident is prohibited from importing any alcoholic

13

As the State concedes, Count V, which charged a pattern of unlawful activity
under the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1601 et
seq. (1995), stands or falls with Counts I, II, and III. Appellant's Br. 31. Therefore,
the magistrate also correctly dismissed Count V.
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beverages into the state unless authorized by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act.
Section 32A-12-212(l)(a) restricts such importation to "one liter of liquor purchased
from without the United States" that is "possessed] for personal consumption and not
for sale or resale." Therefore, a person in Utah who ships beer purchased from BAA
into the state has violated that provision. The State, however, chose not to charge its
own residents in this case.
Similarly, the shipper, if it acted with the requisite culpable mental state, is
subject to prosecution under section 32A-12-503 (the basis for the charge in Count I),
for transporting beer into Utah in violation of state law. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2102 (1995) (requiring proof of culpable mental state for all offenses not involving strict
liability). The State, however, chose not to charge the shipper.
In sum, the State filed against the wrong parties in this case. For whatever
reasons, it elected not to pursue available remedies against the Utah buyers and the
shipper.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should affirm the dismissal of the
charges against BAA.
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